Pakistan's Nuclear Policy by Zafar Khan

Author:Zafar Khan [Khan, Zafar]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Ethnic Studies, American, Asian American Studies, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781317676010
Google: XW8KBAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-07-17T05:57:22+00:00

6

Pakistan’s doctrine of nuclear first use

Introduction

Each nuclear weapon state adopts its nuclear weapon use. It can either be first use (FU) or no first use (NFU). Nuclear weapon use doctrine is adopted to thwart the security threat in order to achieve political and military objectives. It is viewed that the security threat, organizational interests and military bias, national and global strategic culture are the rudimentary conceptual factors that determine a state’s doctrine of nuclear weapon use. Although Pakistan has not yet officially declared its nuclear weapon use doctrine, it declares that Pakistan would follow the FU option to deter both conventional and nuclear attacks. The FU option has been deeply inherent in Pakistani deterrence assumption since the onset of its nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s. This can be assumed from Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s argument that his country needed nuclear weapons to deter both India’s conventional and nuclear attacks.1 In the 1990s, it was revealed that Pakistan had attained a nuclear delivery system (F-16 aircraft), which was kept ready if India carried out air strikes on Kashmir.2

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tests, the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared: ‘These weapons are to deter aggressions, whether nuclear or conventional.’3 This implies that Islamabad would use its nuclear weapons first to deter all forms of aggression. Islamabad’s FU option was also affirmed when Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed rejected India’s offer of an NFU agreement, which he categorically stated as ‘unacceptable’.4 The Pakistani security planners view FU as an important factor for the country’s minimum credible deterrence. Islamabad viewed the FU option as cost effective and consistent with minimum deterrence. At the same time, it was thought that FU would enhance the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent forces. Nevertheless, a much closer look at the existing literature on Pakistan’s nuclear weapon use traces out ambiguity in Pakistan’s nuclear weapon use option. While Islamabad views that it would use its nuclear weapon first, but it is not clear when, where and how exactly it would use nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, many believe that Islamabad would use its nuclear weapon as a last resort, which creates ambiguity.

This chapter provides a critical analysis of Pakistan’s doctrine of FU. It examines why Pakistan opts for the FU option and why it claims simultaneously to use its nuclear weapons as a last resort. Keeping the usability of its deterrent forces, it examines how Islamabad postures for the targeting option, that is, whether Islamabad would opt for counter-value or counter-force targeting, followed by a critique of these two targeting options. Also, this chapter explores the obstacles for Pakistan to rescind the FU option, followed by various benefits ideally tilting towards an NFU option. Before analysing Pakistan’s doctrinal FU option, it is important to examine the debate on FU and NFU in the Cold War era between the USA and the Soviet Union. I briefly commence the chapter by analysing this important debate as a backdrop to set the stage for this chapter.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.